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Supreme Court decisions, especially those that touch on controversial social matters, are 
frequent targets of criticism. Several recent cases are good examples. (As of this writing, these 
cases are not yet formally published. The opinions were found at 
http://supct.law.cornell.edu/supct/). 
• In United States v. Playboy (decided May 22, 2000) the court examined whether §505 of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, which requires cable television operators primarily 
dedicated to sexually oriented programming to either block those channels, or limit their 
transmission to hours when children are unlikely to be viewing. The Court struck down §505 
as violating the First Amendment because the law failed to employ the least restrictive means 
for addressing the problem. Some parents have decried this decision as a bad policy for 
children.  
• In Sternberg v. Carhart (decided June 28, 2000) the Court struck down a Nebraska law 
criminalizing “partial birth abortions” because the law placed an undue burden on the woman 
seeking an abortion by limiting her options to less safe procedures and because the law 
provided no exception for cases where the health of the mother was at risk. Pro-life groups 
have condemned this decision as court-sanctioned infanticide.   
• In Boy Scouts of America v. Dale (decided June 28, 2000) the Court held that applying New 
Jersey’s public accommodations law to require the Boy Scouts to admit James Dale, a 
scoutmaster whose membership in the Scouts was rescinded when he came out as a 
homosexual, violates the Boy Scouts’ First Amendment right of association. Civil rights 
groups say that the decision endorses discrimination.  
However such criticisms do not in themselves assert that the justices in these cases 
misinterpreted or misapplied law. A judicial decision could propound bad policy, or give legal 
protection to immoral activities, or endorse discrimination—and still correctly apply existing 
laws. I want here to investigate the narrow charge that a judicial decision got the law wrong. This 
is usually the central fault alleged in a dissenting opinion.  
• Justice Scalia, for example, in his dissent to Playboy, tells us that the court in several cases—
mainly Ginzburg v. U.S. (1966) and Miller v. California (1972)—has already “recognized 
that commercial entities which engage in ‘the sordid business of pandering’ by ‘deliberately 
emphasiz[ing] the sexually provocative aspects of [their nonobscene products], in order to 
catch the salaciously disposed,’ engage in constitutionally unprotected behavior.” He then 
argues, “Since the Government is entirely free to block [the Playboy channel’s] 
transmissions, it may certainly take the less drastic step of dictating how, and during what 
times, they may occur.”  
• Justice Kennedy, dissenting in Sternberg, claims that the Court’s decision is inconsistent with 
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern  Pa. v. Casey (1992) which insured that “the political 
processes of the State are not to be foreclosed from enacting laws to promote the life of the 
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unborn and to ensure respect for all human life and its potential.” Nebraska’s legislation, 
according to Justice Kennedy, “is well within the State’s competence to enact.”  
• In his dissent in Dale, Justice Stevens wrote, “In fact, until today, we have never once found 
a claimed right to associate in the selection of members to prevail in the face of a State’s 
antidiscrimination law. To the contrary, we have squarely held that a State’s 
antidiscrimination law does not violate a group’s right to associate simply because the law 
conflicts with that group’s exclusionary membership policy.” 
*** 
When is a judicial decision wrong? Different theories of jurisprudence offer different 
answers, of course. I’ll look at the answers given by the theories of H. L. A. Hart and Ronald 
Dworkin, though as will - 2 -p65 be seen, which theory of jurisprudence we use to 
determine a wrong answer is immaterial to my result.  
The law in a community, on H. L. A. Hart’s theory, is the set of  rules picked out by that 
community’s “rules of recognition” which is supposed to distinguish rules of law from rules of 
etiquette, moral rules, religious rules, and so on (Hart 1994, Ch. VI). A simple legal community 
might have as its rule of recognition something like: Laws are the commands inscribed on the 
stone tablets that sit in the tabernacle. A more complex legal community such as ours would 
direct us to acts of legislatures, constitutions, and judicial decisions. But picking out certain rules 
as rules of law (rather than, say, rules of etiquette or morality) is only the beginning.  
Rules of law such as statutes and constitutional provisions, on Hart’s account, are “open-
textured,” which means they have a “determined” or “settled” core of meaning (clear and settled 
points of law), but also an “indeterminate” or “penumbral” area (Hart 1994, Ch. VII). Cases fall 
into the penumbra when they have some things in common with the core or settled instances, but 
lack some standard feature. Judges in penumbral cases have the authority to legislate to settle the 
issues. They are to decide “by choosing between the competing interests in the way which best 
satisfies us”(Hart 1994, 129). A decision in a penumbral case can’t in general be criticized as 
legally incorrect since it makes new law, hence can’t misapply existing law. Of course the judge 
could make a ruling that resolves the conflicting interests at issue in an unsatisfying way, for 
example by giving less important interests more weight over graver ones. This would make bad 
law (because it would give judicial backing to bad policy), but would not misapply existing law. 
It would not be an incorrect decision in the narrow sense.  
Legal correctness for Hart is limited to the clear or settled areas of law. “At any given 
moment judges, even those of a supreme court, are parts of a system the rules of which are 
determinate enough at the center to supply standards of correct judicial decision. These are 
regarded by the courts as something which they are not free to disregard in the exercise of the 
authority to make those decisions which cannot be challenged within the system” (Hart 1994, 
145). A decision that contradicts clear, settled law is thereby legally incorrect.  
But speaking simply of “settled law” does not thereby establish a clear standard of legal 
correctness. In a sense, the totality of court decisions that bears on any case under consideration 
is settled law. Nearly everyone would agree with this, but controversy remains. What settled law 
governs Sternberg, for example?  Is it that the state of Nebraska has, in Casey, already been 
given the right to outlaw certain types of abortion, as the dissent claims? Or that, given Roe v. 
Wade (1973), Nebraska’s law is potentially too restrictive, as the majority alleges? Both are 
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plausible enough descriptions of settled law. How are we to settle what is settled law? Hart’s 
claim that legally correct decision must conform to settled law, then, needs further adumbration. 
Ronald Dworkin compares a body of legal decisions bearing on a certain case with a chain 
novel. Both need interpretations of exactly what has been done in order to continue; and for each 
there is a best interpretation.  Dworkin describes the British case of McLoughlin v. O’Brian 
(1983): “Mrs. McLoughlin’s husband and four children were injured in an automobile accident  
in England at about 4 p.m. on October 19, 1973. She heard about the accident from a neighbor at 
about 6 p.m. and went immediately to the hospital, where she learned that her daughter was dead 
and saw the serious condition of her husband and other children. She suffered nervous shock and 
later sued the defendant driver, whose negligence had caused the accident … for compensation 
for her emotional injuries” (Dworkin 1982, 24). Earlier decisions had awarded compensation for 
emotional damage to people who saw injury to a close relative, though they had been on the 
scene of the accident or had arrived within minutes.  A wife had won compensation for 
emotional injury after she came upon the body of her husband after his fatal accident. Another 
man was allowed to recover when he suffered emotional shock trying to rescue victims of a train 
accident (to whom he was not related).  
The precedents available for the McLoughlin judges are, Dworkin tells us, like the elements 
of a chain novel. Suppose A Christmas Carol comes to you incomplete, stopping, say, just after 
the visitation by the last spirit. You are given the task of completing the story. You might have to 
decide if the character of Scrooge is inherently evil or corrupted by capitalism and redeemable, 
and depending on your answer to that you would continue the story one way rather than another. 
This is not an arbitrary decision. As Dworkin describes it, “Your assignment is to make of the 
text the best it can be …” (Dworkin 1982, 233). To which end you must consider carefully all the 
strands of the story as told thus far. This is not supposed to depend on what you think of human 
nature, but on what has been written already. So too the judge in McLoughlin is to take precedent 
and make from it “an interpretation that both fits and justifies what has gone before, so far as that 
is possible.” Dworkin sets out six interpretations that should be considered by the judge in 
deciding whether Mrs. McLoughlin should receive damages from the negligent driver for her 
emotional shock at the hospital (Dworkin 1982, 240 ff.). One interpretation, for example, focuses 
on the overall cost of compensation in the long run. Another on what could be “reasonably 
foreseen.” A third interpretation insists on physical presence at the accident scene, and a fourth 
disregards physical presence. And so on. In selecting the best interpretation the judge is 
concerned with what “fits the legal record better on the whole.”  
Now there are difficulties with Dworkin’s view. In particular there is no clear-cut test for 
“fit.” Controversies about what law has been settled will inevitably resurface as disagreements 
about what interpretation fits the legal record best. However, Dworkin at least gives us a 
framework in which to describe correct judicial decisions. If there is a best interpretation of the 
legal record, which includes both precedent and statute or constitutional clause, then that 
interpretation will state what settled law is; and a judge deciding a present case must base his 
decision on that interpretation. A judicial decision is correct only if it best continues the best 
interpretation of the legal record. Let’s tentatively call this a theory of truth for legal decisions. 
(Such a theory is, of course, distinct from the epistemological issue of whether we can know 
which interpretation is best.)  
What, though, of incorrect judicial decisions? Let me address the case of Bowers v. 
Hardwick (1986). Bowers probed the constitutionality of a Georgia statute that prohibited 
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consensual sodomy. Though the statute had been declared unconstitutional by the Court of 
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, the state of Georgia appealed, and was ultimately vindicated by 
the U.S. Supreme Court in a 5-4 decision. This seems to me a legal error. The Bowers decision 
contradicts settled law because it misreads the precedents on individual privacy from Griswold v. 
Connecticut (1965), which held that married people have a constitutional right to use 
contraceptive devices; from Eisenstadt v. Baird (1972), which extended the right in Griswold to 
unmarried people; and from Roe v. Wade (1973), which held constitutionally protected a 
woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy at least through the first “trimester.” Those three cases 
are construed by the Bowers court as finding in the constitution “a fundamental individual right 
to decide whether or not to beget or bear a child.” The Georgia statute under review in Bowers is 
upheld because the court found “no connection between family, marriage, or procreation … and 
homosexual sodomy.”  
But Americans always had the right to decide whether or not to bear a child. At no time in 
the U.S. were there ever laws restricting such a right, as there seem to have been in modern 
China. Certainly no such laws were ever under review in Griswold, Eisenstadt, or Roe. The issue 
in the Griswold line of cases is not whether there is a right to decide to bear a child but whether 
there is a right to have sex without begetting children. Those cases find that there is and that no 
law should interfere with that right. Since sodomy, homosexual or heterosexual, is sex without 
procreation, a decision against the Georgia statute is clearly supported by precedent. Hence 
Bowers was wrongly decided. 
And yet can I speak truly when I say that the Bowers court made the wrong decision of law? 
I’ve just claimed that 
(A) Bowers was an incorrect judgment regarding U.S. law.  
Now (A) says that the Supreme Court made an incorrect judgment regarding the law on 
privacy. If (A) were true, it would logically follow that  
 (B) Bowers is not U.S. law. 
But the latter is false. Bowers, for better or worse, is law in America. A clear and central rule 
of recognition of American law is that judicial decisions are legally binding—are law—unless 
overturned. If (B) is false, then (A) must be false, for (A) implies (B) and a valid inference 
cannot have a true premise with a false conclusion.  That is, it is false that Bowers was an 
incorrect judgment regarding U.S. law.  
This discordant result follows no matter what criterion one uses to determine the correctness 
of the judicial decision and no matter what judicial decision is being denounced. To switch 
political hats for a moment, consider the case that originalists seem to regard as a kind of 
constitutional original sin, Griswold v. Wade. Originalists decry the Warren Court’s construal of 
the Bill of Rights in such a way as to belie the intentions of the ratifiers, who could never have 
intended any of the first ten amendments, singly or in concert, to forbid a state from 
criminalizing contraception. (See, for example, Bork 1990, 95 ff.) Yet even when the originalist 
claims that Griswold was incorrectly decided, his claim logically implies that Griswold is not 
law, which is, again, a manifest falsehood; and hence it cannot be true that Griswold was 
incorrectly decided.  
There are, to be sure, other ways of claiming incorrectness in law: 
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(A1)  Were the Bowers court to have read precedent correctly, it would have decided 
against the state of Georgia. 
(A2)  The Supreme Court had stronger legal grounds to rule against the state of Georgia 
in Bowers than to find in its favor and thus should have done so. 
(A3)  In the ideal realm of correct legal decisions, Georgia loses Bowers. 
None of (A1) through (A3) implies (B). However, none of them is exactly what is meant by 
(A), which is descriptive in nature. (A) purports to state a legal fact—more accurately a mistake 
of legal fact. (A1) through (A3) are either predictive in nature or normative. It is a statement of 
the form of (A), however, that is generally intended when a court decision is criticized as 
incorrectly decided. When one criticizes a judicial decision in the narrow sense one tries to assert 
that the decision misstated what the law is. The surprising conclusion is that such a judgment 
can’t in general be true. At least we non-judges can’t state a truth by stating (A). The sole 
exception is when a later or higher court overturns a previous decision (as Brown overturned 
Plessy). Here the claim that an earlier decision is incorrect is made true by the fact that the later 
court’s pronouncement is concurrently a falsification of the contrary decision and a true 
statement regarding what the (new) law is. 
Some may be taken aback by the conclusion that we (non-judges) can’t assert truly that a 
certain decision is incorrectly decided as a matter of law, and will think that there must be a 
misstep in the argument from (A) to (B). But that inference is valid. Consider the following case. 
A committee of nine schoolchildren is given the task of deciding “16 x 5/8,” and they come up 
with the incorrect answer “12.” Now that equation is wrongly decided as a matter of ordinary 
arithmetic, and given that it is wrongly decided, it follows—does it not?—that “16 x 5/8 = 12” is 
not a truth of ordinary arithmetic.   
(C) “16 x 5/8 = 12” is incorrectly decided as a matter of ordinary arithmetic. 
(D) Therefore, “16 x 5/8 = 12” is not a truth of ordinary arithmetic. 
(C) logically entails (D) and furthermore arrives at a true conclusion. Now the logic of the 
inference from (C) to (D) and the inference from (A) to (B) are exactly parallel; both, that is, are 
valid inferences. The difference is in the truth of the arguments’ respective conclusions. “16 x 
5/8 = 12” really is not an arithmetic truth—that is, conclusion (D) is true. But conclusion (B) is 
false. Bowers really is law, and hence (A) can’t be true.  
It may be thought that the purported falsity of (B) depends on a faulty conception of law. Is 
it sufficient for a judgment by a duly authorized court to be law, or must the decision additionally 
meet some other criterion, such as being a correct reading of precedent? Clearly, it does not 
describe our legal system to say that a judicial decision counts as law only if it correctly 
understands precedent. While there is a possible rule of recognition that requires correct reading 
of precedent for a judicial decision to count as law, a community that adopted such a rule would 
thereby lose the advantages of having a final court of appeal. Its disputes would simply start up 
again. Such a community would perpetually live in a legal limbo in which disagreement raged 
over the correct reading of precedent.  Nothing would ever get settled.  
*** 
I had tentatively called Dworkin’s a theory of truth for judicial decisions. However, it can’t 
really be the right theory of truth for judicial decisions if a decision that fails to meet its criteria 
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turns out to be true—because we boomerang back from the falsehood of propositions like (B) to 
the falsehood of propositions like (A). This result would befall any theory—some variety of 
originalism, for example—that construed itself as a theory of truth for judicial decisions. Any 
such theory, then, should really be thought of as a guide for judges to reach decisions.  But it is a 
guide not in the way that the rules of arithmetic are a guide to getting the right answer in sums. 
The rules of arithmetic offer instructions on how to get the right answer as well as form a 
criterion of correctness (of truth) for what the right answer is. Rather, Dworkin’s theory (or the 
originalist’s or …) is a guide in the sense that a road map is a guide. A road map can show you 
how to get to a certain place, but it doesn’t set a standard for the “correctness” of your 
destination.  
*** 
Appendix 
My critical remarks against Bowers developed out of conversations with Mr. Michael 
McFerren. Also, it has been brought to my attention by Mr. Wesley Person that the Supreme 
Court of Georgia has overturned that state’s sodomy statute “insofar as it criminalizes the 
performance of private, non-commercial acts of sexual intimacy between persons legally able to 
consent ‘manifestly infringes upon a constitutional provision’ … which guarantees to the citizens 
of Georgia the right of privacy.” Powell v. State No. S98A0755 (Nov. 23, 1998). The case 
appealed was a conviction of heterosexual sodomy. While Powell makes the holding in Bowers 
moot in Georgia, it doesn’t overturn Bowers which concerns the U.S. Constitution, and the 
sixteen or so states that still criminalize sodomy can take legal succor from Bowers. 
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